Conclusions from the Inaja Fire Investigation Report

Here is a brief summary of this entrapment fatality fire and a few of the conclusions from its investigation. What stands out to you viewing this from the present day?

The Inaja Fire was started on the morning of November 24, 1956, by a child playing with matches in rural San Diego County, California. By 1700 that day the fire had burned under Santa Ana wind conditions to 25,000 acres. Later that evening a fire crew was assigned to construct indirect handline into the San Diego River Canyon, from the rim to the dry riverbed.

A piece of dozer line above the canyon was fired out before line construction began into the canyon itself. During line construction, a spot fire was observed about 1,000 feet below the crew. The crew ceased work and began to hike uphill out of the canyon, when more spot fires were observed below the crew. The wind shifted, blowing the spot fires upslope at the retreating crew. A group of 11 crewmembers were unable to outrun the fire uphill in the steep canyon topography and perished.

Those firefighters who were lost on the Inaja Fire: Albert Anderson, Miles Daniels, William Fallin, George Garcia, Virgil Hamilton, Carlton Lingo, Forrest Maxwell, Joseph O'Hara, Lonnie Sheppard, Joe Tibbets, and Leroy Wehrung.

Conclusions from the Inaja Fire Investigation Report:

“A. Fire Behavior. The disastrous flareup of the Inaja fire was caused by a critical combination of highly flammable fuels, steep topography, and adverse weather. The lull in the fire before and at the time of arrival of the night crews created a false sense of security, even though existing conditions of fuel, topography, and weather were critical. 

B. Crew location in canyon. The men were taken down the line into the canyon owing to a lack of information to show possible danger from the fire in the canyon below. The contributing factors were:

a. Absence of specific information on the fire status in San Diego Canyon available for the briefing at the base camp, due to poor conditions for aerial reconnaissance. 

b. Emphasis placed on the danger of the burning-out fire rather than on the main fire in the canyon below, when the day division boss briefed the night overhead personnel. 

c. Quiet appearance of the fire as viewed from the rim. 

d. The night overhead personnel had not seen the terrain in daylight. 

e. Lack of detailed scouting of the canyon on sector G during the day. 

f. Absence of contact with the bosses of the division across the canyon who had a different vantage point for viewing the situation. 

C. Trail location. The location of the fire trail on the specific ridge where it was built instead of the spur ridge up the canyon was questionable. The previous behavior of the fire and the position above and alongside a precipitous chimney made the chosen location hazardous. 

D. Burning-out. Sound fire fighting principles call for burning out the intervening fuels between the control line and the fire edge. The effect of the burning-out fire on the behavior of the main fire and of the planned escape routes is a vital factor influencing decisions on when, where, and how to burn out, and where to place men. Fire behavior is not well enough understood to firmly establish the possible effect of the burning out fire in sucking the main fire rapidly up the chimney at the site of the disaster. Other factors would have permitted the explosive run without the presence of the burning-out fire. Furthermore, the burning-out fire did not cut off the escape route. 

E. Lookout. The crew cutting line into the canyon received warning to come out when a crew boss on the upper part of the line saw the fire heating up at a point below the men. It is uncertain in the Inaja fire disaster that a specifically designated lookout would have given warning any sooner. However, it is vital that a lookout be designated when crews are in a potentially dangerous location. 

F. Water. Exhausting the water supply from the tanker at the time of the flareup did not cause or contribute to the tragedy. The flames that raced up the canyon slope were of such height and were extended so far in advance of the burning fuel, that water available from one or several ground tankers would not have had a material effect. 

G. Personnel. The leaders on the Inaja fire were capable and experienced. They were trained in accordance with recognized Forest Service standards. There is, however, need for more intensive fire behavior training for key fire supervisory personnel. Line crews on the sector where the tragedy occurred were experienced, trained fire fighters. Moreover, on this sector there were experienced overhead personnel from the local forest and from other forests.”

This note also appears in the report’s “Recommendations” section. (Remember, this report is from 1957.)

“The investigators pointed out that in general, although not related in particular to the Inaja fire, present Government salary and wage rates make it difficult to obtain and hold competent fire control personnel. Controlling mass forest fires is a difficult and highly technical job. The specifications for these positions should be further reviewed with appropriate Department and Civil Service Commission officials.”

What does this look back at a report from 1957 make you think about wildland fire conditions and lessons – both operationally and organizationally – from the past?